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This paper analyzes using a sample of non-financial Brazilian companies from 2005 to 2007 whether 
corporate social responsibility has an impact on firm value. Using companies’ Tobin’s Q as a proxy for 
their market value, the paper finds that firms that compose the Bovespa Corporate Sustainability Index 
(ISE) are traded with a premium compared to the other publicly traded firms. The result is robust to the 
inclusion of a set of control variables and the method of estimation. In addition, after controlling for 
self-selectivity, the results confirm that policies that focus corporate sustainability add value to the 
firm.  The  paper  indicates  that  the  benefits  of  corporate  social  responsibility  policies  surpass  the 
possible costs implied by the adoption of such policies, leading corporate social responsibility to exert a 
positive impact on firm value.  
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  According the 2007 report on socially responsible investment trends in the United States (Social 
Investment Forum, 2007), Social Responsible Investments (SRI) have been growing in a faster pace 
than  any  other  asset  in  the  US.  The  text  asserts  that  11  percent  of  assets  under  professional 
management  in  the  US  are  related  to  Social  Responsible  Investments.  It  also  shows  that  Social 
Responsible Investments rose from $639 billion in 1995 to $2.71 trillion in 2007. In addition, in the 
period 2005-2007, the report indicates that SRI increased more than 18 percent a year while the other 
assets managed by professional investors increased less than 3 percent a year. Moreover, projections 
indicate that social responsible screening by investors will increase in the future.  
  Although the data has shown this rapid increase in social responsible investments, the economic 
literature  has  not  reached  a  consensus  whether  this  re-orientation  towards  policies  that  maximize 
stakeholders surplus instead of the traditional policies of maximization of shareholders value yields 
more efficient outcomes. The literature argues that absent externalities, policies where firms maximize 
shareholder value are optimal from an efficiency point of view. Yet, in the presence of externalities, 
regulation would lead to more efficient outcomes since it would lead managers to internalize these 
externalities. Absent regulations, the screening imposed by investors towards social responsible assets 
would force managers to adopt policies to achieve the best social allocation.  
  Social responsibility can also be viewed as an attempt to move managers’ focus toward more 
long-term value maximization. It might be the case that manager place more weight on current results 
disregarding  a  long-run  maximization  value.  In  this  scenario,  social  responsibility  policies  would 
represent only a change in the current paradigma of value maximization moving for a more long term 
objectives. It would characterize a trade-off between short run costs and long-run benefits moving to a 
more sustainable path for the firm. 
   The costs associated to the adoption of corporate social policies would be the possibility of 
deadlocks in the decision making with a possibility of the existence of conflicting objectives and 
generation of inefficiency on decision making. In addition, it would have a lack of clear mission for 
management with more vague objectives than the traditional profit maximization. The main benefit 
would be a reduction in the cost of capital. Social responsible firms would be rewarded with a lower 
cost of capital since investors would increase their demand for their assets, leading to higher stock 
prices.  
  The empirical evidence with respect to the impact of corporate social responsibility on firms’ 
performance is mixed. Most of the papers show that the difference in expected returns between a  
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corporate responsibility and a market index is very small and there is little difference in moments and 
the indexes are very highly correlated.
2 Yet, event studies indicate that firms that are deleted from an 
index of social responsibility suffer a price drop.  Recent studies focus on the existence of a downward 
sloping demand curve for stocks, Hong and Kacperczyk (2008) show that sin stocks (tobacco, gaming 
and alcohol) are neglected by investors  and are traded at a lower market-to-book ratio compared to 
other stocks from comparable industries.    
  This paper casts light on this question by analyzing the direct impact of corporate responsibility 
policies  on  firm  value  in  a  sample  of  non-financial  Brazilian  firms  from  2005  to  2007.  Using 
companies’ Tobin’s Q as a proxy for their market value, the paper finds that firms that compose the 
Bovespa  Corporate  Sustainability  Index  (ISE)  are  traded  with  a  premium  compared  to  the  other 
publicly traded firms. The result is robust to the inclusion of a set of control variables and the method 
of estimation. Therefore, the paper indicates that the benefits of corporate social responsibility polices 
surpass  the  possible  costs  implied  by  the  adoption  of  such  policies,  leading  corporate  social 
responsibility to exert a positive impact on firm value.   
  The paper contributes to the literature in different directions. First, differently than previous 
studies for the Brazilian ISE index, the paper is the first to analyze the direct impact of corporate 
sustainability policies on firms’ market value. Lo and Sheu (2007) performed a similar study for the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index, the authors found support to the hypothesis that sustainable policies 
cause an increase in firm value. This paper goes one step further by using different parametric methods 
to compare social responsible and other stocks and including an extensive set of controls to assert the 
robustness of the results. Different than previous studies, the paper addresses a traditional critique that 
previous studies suffered that is the possible problem of self-selectivity in the construction of the index. 
Performing a non-parametric propensity score matching estimation, the paper confirms the positive 
impact of composing a sustainability index on firm value.  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the description of the Bovespa corporate 
sustainability index and its performance since 2005. Section 3 reports and discusses the data. Section 4 
shows the methodology and results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 2. The Bovespa Corporate Sustainability Index (ISE) 
  According the BOVESPA (São Paulo stock exchange) the corporate sustainability Index (ISE) 
was  introduced  in  2005  in  order  to  create  a  benchmark  for  socially  responsible  investments.  It  is 
                                                 
2 Cavalcante, Bruni e Costa (2007) e Rezende et al (2007) confirm these fact using the Brazilian corporate sustainability 
index   
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composed  for  shares  of  companies  “highly  committed  to  social  responsibility  and  corporate 
sustainability and also to promote good practices in the Brazilian corporate environment”.  
  The ISE is composed by companies ranked at the top of corporate sustainability policies among 
the  most  liquid  stocks  in  the  BOVESPA.  The  selection  is  made  according  the  answers  of  a 
questionnaire that comprehends three different aspects: environmental, social and economical. These 
aspects are divided into four different groups of criteria. Polices (commitment indicators), management 
(program, target, and monitoring indicators), performance and legal compliance. After being ranked, 
the composition of the index is decided and approved by a board composed by representatives from 
different  institutions  that  compose  the  Brazilian  society.
3  The  index  is  composed  by  a  maximum 
number of 40 companies and a company can be excluded from the index during the reevaluation period 
the company whether no longer it meets the inclusion criteria, or between two periods of reevaluation 
either if the company enters a regime of preventive composition with creditors or files for bankruptcy 
or any event that changes significantly a component of the index. Table 1 shows the composition of the 
index in the years of the study.  
  Figure 1 shows the behavior of the ISE and BOVESPA indexes. Interesting to note in figure 1 
that both indexes are highly correlated confirming the doubts about the existence of capital gains of 
composing a sustainability index. The paper tries to address this question.  
 
3. Data 
  The database used comprehends all non-financial Brazilian firms listed in the São Paulo Stock 
Exchange from 2005 to 2007. The accounting and financial data were collected from the Economática 
site. All companies under judicial administration were excluded from the sample. The number of firms 
varies in each year included in the study but, on average, 241 firms were analyzed.
4 All the variables 
used are evaluated at the end of the fiscal year. It is important to note that the analysis is developed 
only for non-financial firms since the market value of financial companies is determined for different 
factors than the non-financial sector, even the sustainability questionnaire is built in a different fashion 
for companies in the financial sector.   
  Tobin’s Q was used as a proxy for firm value. This is defined as the ratio of the firm market 
value to the replacement cost of assets. The firm market value is calculated as the book value of total 
                                                 
3 Institutions participants are: ABRAPP, ANBID, APIMEC, BOVESPA, IBGC, IFC, Ethos, Brazilian Ministry of the 
environment and UNEP.  
4 In an exercise of robustness, the analysis involved only firms that were included in the sample in 2005 and still remained 
in it in 2007, totaling 205 firms. There was no alteration in the results.   
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assets plus the market value of the equity minus the book value of the equity. The replacement cost of 
assets is calculated as being equal to the book value of the firm’s assets. In this way, the following 
formula is used to calculate a company’s Tobin’s Q.
5 
 
Q = Book Value of the Assets – Book Value of the Equity + Market Value of the Equity / Book Value of the Assets                                                              (1)  
 
  Table 2 shows a summary of the statistics in the sample. The data indicates that the sample 
shows enough variability. The total assets of the firms in the sample are worth R$ 5,651 millions with 
standard deviation equal to R$ 18,470 millions, indicating that the sample is not confined to large-sized 
firms, but also includes medium-sized and small firms. The situation is similar when the total sales and 
market value are analyzed. Another relevant fact in table 2 is that Tobin’s Q has a mean (1.57) higher 
than  the  median  (0.97),  showing  asymmetry  in  its  distribution.  To  minimize  this  problem  in  the 
subsequent estimations, the logarithm of this variable will be used at the econometric implementation.
6  
  To analyze whether sustainability policies have an impact on firm value, we control for other 
variables mentioned in the literature and that may have an impact on this value. The control variables 
used are: 
  Derivatives: Allayannis and Weston (2001) for US companies and Allayannis, Rossi and Laham 
(2008) for Brazilian firms and Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2007) in a cross-country study show the 
existence of a hedging premium, i.e., firms that use derivatives for risk management purposes have 
higher market value. Moreover, they show that the hedging premium is higher for firms with strong 
internal governance. A variable for the firm’s hedging policy was constructed. The variable named 
derivatives represents a dummy variable which assumes the value 1 if the firm uses derivatives and 0 
otherwise. The data on the use of currency derivatives were collected directly from companies’ annual 
reports,  located  in  the  explanatory  notes  under  the  item  financial  instruments.  It  is  important  to 
highlight that for a firm to be considered a derivative user it must explicitly state the derivative or 
hedging policy adopted and the notional value of the derivative used. Table 2 shows that around 40% 
of the companies in the sample use derivatives.    
  Size: The proxy is calculated as a logarithm of the firm total assets. Either by its relationship 
with profitability (Mueller, 1987), or by its relationship with the firm’s efficiency (Peltzman, 1977), the 
                                                 
5 As a robustness exercise, Tobin’s Q was also defined as a simple relation market-to-book, that is, the ratio between the 
market value to the book value of equity. Allayannis and Weston (2001) showed that the result is robust with relation to 
adopting procedures developed by Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) and by Perfect and Wiles (1994) for the calculus of 
company’s Tobin’s Q. Allayannis, Lel and Miller (2007) use a similar formulation.  
6 A similar fact was observed by Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Jin and Jorion (2004).  
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firm size may be related to its value. Previous literature found a negative relationship between size and 
firm’s market value.  
  Access to financial markets: Lang and Stulz (1994) and Servaes (1996) argue that firms without 
access to the financial markets will have a higher Q, as they will only execute projects with positive 
present value. Moreover Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) discuss that greater the dividend yield, 
the lower is the probability that the firm is financially constrained. Following Allayannis and Weston 
(2001), in order to control for firms’ financial constraints we add a dummy for the firms that pay 
dividends. This dummy is set to 1 if the firm paid dividends and 0 otherwise. Therefore, we expect a 
negative relationship between dividends and firms’ Tobin’s Q.  
  Leverage: previous studies (Allayannis and Weston, 2001) show that the firm’s capital structure 
is related to its value. To control for differences in the capital structure, we calculate the firm leverage 
defined by the ratio of total debt to equity. The impact of leverage on firm value is ambiguous. If there 
are  tax  shields  with  relation  to  the  payments  of  interest,  or  the  debt  soothes  the  dispute  between 
shareholders, manager and creditors, the impact is positive. If an increase in the leverage represents an 
increase in the likelihood of incurring payment of bankruptcy costs, the impact is negative.  
  Profitability: A profitable firm may trade at a premium in relation to a less profitable one; 
therefore, firms that are more profitable are expected to have a higher Tobin’s Q. The index return over 
assets (ROA) calculated by the ratio of net income to total assets is used as proxy for the firm’s 
profitability. 
  Investment  opportunities:  Myers  (1977)  show  that  firm  value  depends  on  firm  investment 
opportunities. The ratio of investment to sales – investment being calculated by the variation of fixed 
assets – is used as indicative of the firm’s investment opportunities.
7 
  Geographic diversification: Several theories suggest that firms that diversify their operations 
geographically present a higher value in the market. Mork and Yeung (1991) and Bodnar, Tang and 
Weintrop (1997) found a positive relation between geographic diversification and firm value. We built 
a dummy variable, which is set to 1 when the firm develops activities in other countries as an exporter 
of goods or has subsidiaries abroad and 0 otherwise. The multinationality of a firm is expected to relate 
positively to its value.
8 
                                                 
7 Empirical studies also use the ratio of research and development investments to total sales as an indicator of investment 
opportunities. Unfortunately, this information is not available for all the firms. 
8  Allayannis  and  Weston  (2001)  used  the  ratio  between  foreign  sales  and  total  sales  as  proxy  for  the  geographic 
diversification of the firm. In this study, we opted to use a more representative variable of the firm’s multinationality.  
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  Industrial  Diversification:  The  theory  establishes  an  ambiguous  relationship  between  the 
production diversification in several segments and firm value, however, empirical evidence (Berger and 
Ofek,  1995;  Lang  and  Stulz,  1994)  suggests  a  negative  relationship  between  firm  value  and  its 
industrial diversification. A variable dummy is built which is set to 1 if the firm operates in more than 
one industrial segment and 0 otherwise. 
  Industry effect: If the firms in the sustainability index are concentrated in high-Q segments, then 
these firms will have higher value not because they adopted sustainable policies, but because they 
belong to a specific industrial segment. A dummy variable is used to analyze the industry effect on firm 
value. 
  Time effects: The macroeconomic situation of the country may affect firm value. Restrictions to 
the international flow of capital, adoption of taxes on investors, changes in the legislation may, among 
other factors, have an impact on firm value. Annual dummies are used to control for the significance of 
the macroeconomic situation on firm value.  
  The variable of our main attention is the sustainability dummy. This variable assumes the value 
of 1 whether the firm is in the composition of the sustainability index and 0 otherwise. Table 3 shows 
the main differences in characteristics between the firms in the ISE index and the other firms. 
  Table 3 reveals the first evidence on the impact of sustainable polices on firm value. The data in 
Table 3 shows that the firms in the ISE index present a greater Tobin’s Q than those that do not 
compose  it.  The  test  for  the  equality  of  the  means  indicates  that  the  firms  that  compose  the 
sustainability index have a greater market value that those that do not compose the index. 
  Table  3 also shows that firms in the ISE index are larger, use more extensively derivatives – an 
indication that these firms have a more structured risk management policies - these firms have less 
leverage, have higher profitability and pay more dividends. Except for the geographic diversification in 
2006, it seems that there is no significant differences among companies in the ISE index and non-ISE 
wit respect to investment opportunities and industrial diversification.  Yet, these results do not imply 
any causality. This fact will be analyzed in the next section.  
 
4.  Methodology and Results   
  This analysis tests whether sustainability has an impact on firm value. The following equation is 
estimated: 
                              it it it it it tobin ε γ.X bility β.Sustenta α , Q + + + =                                                    (2) 
where:    
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  Sustainability = Dummy variable if the firm is in the composition of the ISE Index and 0 
otherwise.  
  Xit = Control variables mentioned previously. 
  First, two econometric methods were used for the estimation of equation (2): pooled OLS and 
panel. We adopted two different methods because in the case that there is serial correlation in the 
composition of the Index the estimation using pooled OLS would underestimate the standard deviation 
of the coefficients. In addition, the estimation using panel techniques permits the control for individual 
effects of each firm. The results of the equation estimation (2) are found in Table 4. 
  Results in table 4 confirm that firms in the sustainability index have a higher market value than 
firms  that  do  not  compose  the  index.  Corroborating  Lo  and  Sheu  (2007)  for  the  Dow  Jones 
sustainability index there is evidence that being sustainable causes an increase in firm value. In this 
way, when investors compare the costs and benefits of firms’ sustainability policies they are likely to 
recompense managers for the adoption of such policies. This result is robust to the inclusion of the 
control variables and the method of estimation adopted. Following the hedging literature, the results in 
table 4 indicate a sustainability premium varying from 10 to 19 percent; therefore, everything else 
equal, firms in the sustainability index worth 10 to 19 percent more than firms that do not compose the 
index.  
  With  relation  to  the  control  variables,  consistent  with  Allayannis  and  Weston  (2001)  and 
Hagelin et al. (2004), the results indicate that the adoption of a hedging policy increases firm value. 
The results show a positive and significant impact of the hedging policy on firm value. 
   Corroborating  the  previous  literature,  the  results  in  Table  4  also  show  the  existence  of  a 
negative relation between size and firm value, indicating that larger firms trade at a discount. The 
results also confirm that firms that pay dividends show lower Qs, corroborating the hypothesis that 
firms that have no access to the financial market adopted positive present value projects leading to 
higher Qs. 
  The results in Table 4 point out that firms with higher leverage present higher value, confirming 
the  theories  of  monitoring  by  debt  or  the  importance  of  tax  shields.  The  results  show  that  more 
profitable  firms  present  higher  Qs,  indicated by  the  significant  and positive  relation  between  firm 
profitability and the firm’s Tobin’s Q. 
  Confirming the expectations, the multinationality of the firms has a positive impact on their 
values. Similarly, firms with higher growth opportunities have higher market value but this result is not 
robust across different specifications. Yet, contrasting to the previous empirical literature, industrial  
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diversification  has  a  positive  impact  on  firm  value,  but  this  result  is  not  robust  in  different 
specifications. 
 
4.1 Robustness Exercises 
  The main problem that affects the estimation of the impact of the sustainability policies on firm 
market value is the possible self-selection bias. The problem arises when characteristics of the firms 
might cause then to adopt sustainable policies but these variables might also affect the outcome – 
firms’ market value. The econometric literature points out to propensity score methods as a way to 
solve this problem. This method employs the predicted probability of a group membership – treatment 
vs. control group – based on observed predictors to create a counterfactual group and then propensity 
scores are used for matching.  
  First, we estimate the propensity scores using a probit model. The dependent variable is the 
sustainability dummy. Absent formal models, we use our control variables as our explanatory variables.  
  The results reported in the panel A of Table 5 indicate that size, the use of derivatives and 
firms’ profitability are important determinants of the probability of a firm composes the sustainability 
index. These results are robust with respect to the period of the estimation. Larger firms, firms with 
better risk management policies and more profitable are more likely to incur in sustainable policies.   
  Panel B of table 5 compares the Tobin’s Q of the two groups. The results corroborate our 
previous estimations indicating that firms that compose the sustainability index have higher market 
value, implying a positive premium for the adoption of sustainable policies. Results in panel b show 
that for all years of the sample companies’ in the ISE index have higher Tobin’s Q than non-ISE 
companies  and  that  except  for  the  year  of  2007,  the  difference  between  the  firms  is  statistically 
significant. More important, the difference is significant for the whole period of the sample.  
 
5. Conclusion 
  This study analyzed the impact of firms’ sustainability policies on their market value for a 
sample of Brazilian non-financial companies from 2005 to 2007. The results indicate that the adoption 
of policies that focus on companies’ sustainability do increase the value of the firm. They also indicate 
that  the  positive  impact  of  these  policies  is  independent  of  the  econometric  method  and  period 
analyzed.  The  result  is  also  robust  with  relation  to  the  inclusion  of  control  variables  and  to  the 
correction of the possible self-selection problem.     
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  The results of the estimation are in line with studies by Lo and Sheu (2007) for companies in the 
Dow Jones sustainability index, displaying evidence that for Brazilian companies there is a significant 
gain in adopting sustainability policies. 
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Figure 1  
ISE and IBOVESPA Indexes 
Figure 1 shows the daily behavior of BOVESPA Corporate Sustainability Index (ISE) and the São Paulo stock exchange 
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Table 1  
Composition of the ISE Index 
Table 1 shows the composition of the Corporate Sustainability Index in the years of 2005, 2006 and 2007.  
2005  2006  2007 
CESP  Acesita  AES Tietê 
Copesul  ALL  Arcelor Mittal Brasil 
Eletrobrás  Aracruz  Aracruz 
Weg  Arcelor  Bradesco 
ALL  Banco do Brasil  Banco do Brasil 
Aracruz  Bradesco  Braskem 
Arcelor  Braskem  CCR 
Banco do Brasil  CCR  Cemig 
Bradesco  Celesc  CESP 
Braskem  Cemig  Coelce 
CCR  Coelce  Copel 
Celesc  Copel  CPFL Energia 
Cemig  CPFL Energia  DASA 
Copel  DASA  Eletrobrás 
CPFL Energia  Eletropaulo  Eletropaulo 
DASA  Embraer  Embraer 
Eletropaulo  Energias do Brasil  Energias Brasil 
Embraer  Gerdau  Gerdau 
Gol  Gerdau metalúrgica  Gerdau metalúrgica 
Itaú  Gol  Iochp-Maxion 
Itausa  Itaú  Itaubanco 
Iochp-Maxion  Itausa  Light 
Natura  Iochp-Maxion  Natura 
Perdigão  Localiza  Perdigão 
Suzano Papel  Natura  Petrobrás 
Tractebel  Perdigão  Sabesp 
Unibanco  Petrobrás  Sadia 
VCP  Suzano Papel  Suzano papel 
  Suzano Petro  Suzano Petro 
  TAM  Tractebel 
  Tractebel  VCP 
  Ultra Unibanco  Weg 























Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for a sample of Brazilian non-financial firms from 2005 to 2007. Table 2 also 
shows the summary statistics of control variables used in the analysis. Derivatives stands for a dummy variable for the use 
of derivatives. Profitability represents the ratio of net income to book value of assets. Investment opportunities is the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to equity. Dividends is a dummy variable if the firm 
paid dividends. Industrial diversification is a dummy if the firm operates in different segments. Geographic diversification is 
a dummy if the firm operates in the foreign market or have subsidiaries abroad.  
Variable / Statistics  N  Mean  Standard 
Deviation   Median 
Tobin’s Q  725  1.57  0.97  1.29 
Total Assets (R$ million)  725  5,651  18,470  1,366 
  Total Sales (R$ million)  725  4,493  15,170  1,224 
Market Value (R$ million)  725  5,288  22,720  1,061 
Derivatives  725  0.38  0.48  0 
Profitability   725  0.092  0.099  0.087 
Investment Opportunities   725  0.021  0.90  0.008 
Leverage   725  0.69  2.12  0.27 
Dividends  725  0.76  0.42  1.00 
Industrial Diversification  725  0.23  0.41  0.00 
Geographic Diversification  725  0.17  0.37  0.00 
 
 
Table 3  
Comparison between ISE and non-ISE firms 
Table  3  examines  the  main  differences  between  firms  that  compose  the  ISE  Index  and  the  other  firms.*,**  denote, 
respectively, significance at 5 and 10% of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the sample. Asterisks are placed above the higher 
value.   
      2005  2006  2007 
ISE  24  30  28  Number of Firms 
Non  213  217  213 
ISE  2.06*  2.15*  2.29* 
Tobin’s Q 
Non  1.66  2.02  1.88 
ISE  15.6*  15.8*  16.1*  Size  
(log Total Assets)  Non  13.3  13.4  13.6 
ISE  0.79*  0.83*  0.68* 
Derivatives 
Non  0.34  0.23  0.29 
ISE  0.56  0.35  0.31 
Leverage 
Non  3.90*  2.83*  0.89 
ISE  0.16*  0.14*  0.145* 
Profitability 
Non  0.076  0.071  0.073 
ISE  0.88*  0.93*  0.89* 
Dividends 
Non  0.63  0.65  0.69 
ISE  0.02  0.062  0.10  Investment  
Opportunities  Non  0.10  0.019  0.030 
ISE  0.25  0.26  0.29  Industrial  
Diversification  Non  0.22  0.21  0.22 
ISE  0.29  0.33*  0.25  Geographic 





Table 4 shows the estimation result of equation (2). Pooled means estimation by pooled OLS and Panel means estimation 
per panel of fixed effects. The explanatory variable is the logarithm of Tobin’s Q. Sustainability is a dummy variable that 
assumes the value of 1 if the firm is the composition of the Corporate Sustainability Index (ISE) and 0 otherwise. t-statistics 
are in parentheses.  *, ** denote significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
  Pooled  Panel 












Size    -0.114 
(-6.65)* 
-0.086 




Derivatives    0.171 
(4.31)* 
0.197 




Dividends    -0.029 
(-5.46)* 
-0.027 




Leverage    0.082 
(4.47)* 
0.093 




Profitability    1.96 
(6.85)* 
1.94 





Opportunity    0.047 
(2.92)* 
0.030 





Diversification    0.119 
(2.39)* 
0.029 





Diversification    0.176 
(3.49)* 
0.107 





Dummies  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Industry 
Dummies  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
N  725  725  725  725  725  725 























Table 5  
Propensity Score Matching 
Table 5 shows the result of the estimation of the difference in Tobin’s Q between firms that compose the sustainability 
index  (ISE)  and  non-participants  using  a  non-parametric  matching  estimation.  Panel  A  shows  the  estimation  of  the 
probability of the firm compose the index using  a PROBIT model. Panel B shows the result of the comparison between the 
two groups. *,** stands for, respectively, 5% and 10% statistical significance. t-statistics are in parenthesis.  
Panel A – Estimation of the probability of being on the Sustainability Index 
Characteristics  2005 - 2007  2005  2006  2007 






































































N  725  237  247  241 
Pseudo - R2  0.316  0.288  0.356  0.344 
Panel B – Propensity Score Matching – Tobin’s Q 
Matchings  82  24  30  28 
ISE  1.989  2.063  2.025  2.298 
Non-ISE  1.514  1.332  1.517  1.888 
Difference  0.475*  0.730*  0.508*  0.410 
Standard Deviation 
(t statistics) 
0.113 
(4.18) 
0.219 
(3.33) 
0.200 
(2.54) 
1.32 
(0.31) 
 